Title: "Anthropology and Recognition in Hobbes's Leviathan"
Nicola Marcucci
Abstract:
Is it possible—and if so, in what terms—to talk of a Hobbesian theory of recognition? This is the question I will try to answer in my paper. Before proceeding in this direction, however, it is important to clarify the question. The concept of recognition has become central within moral and political philosophy since Fichte and Hegel’s German idealism. The latter, in particular, is credited with presenting the concept of recognition in terms of an historically situated intersubjective relationship. The Hegelian master-slave dialectic takes form within a polemical relationship to the natural law tradition, of which Hobbes is considered one of the earliest representatives.
In order to speak of a Hobbesian theory of recognition, I will thus start from this juxtaposition between Hobbes and Hegel, evaluating its most salient aspects and highlighting some points of continuity (I). Then, once I have centered—or perhaps, more correctly, de-centered—Hegel’s reception of Hobbes, I will shed light on the theoretical framework in which we might find the Hobbesian theory of recognition, namely, in his anthropology. The rooting of the theory of recognition in Hobbes’ anthropology, I argue, is highlighted by the centrality of the passions of honor and glory, and confirmed by the existence of the ninth Law of Nature (II). I will then turn to focus on Hobbes’ theory of authorization and representation, presenting it as a condition of possibility for recognition, and go on to discuss the way in which it, paradoxically, neutralizes the political implications of his theory of recognition. In so doing, I will also motivate the choice of investigating the theme of recognition by starting from the Leviathan, the text in which Hobbes introduces his theory of representation (III). In light of this, I will show how, in addition to being of an historical-philosophical interest, the Hobbesian theory acquires new clarity when discussed in the context of the current crisis of sovereignty and the consequent inadequacies of the modern logic of legitimacy in which the link between recognition and representation plays a central role (IV).