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Hello, everyone. First, I want to thank Wesley as well as the organizers of the conference for the chance to come and respond to Wesley's paper today. This is the first time I've had the opportunity to respond to someone else's paper at a conference in this way so I hope that my comments live up to expectations.

But moving right along, I'm convinced by Wesley's argument that Aristotle has a notion of dirty hands. Moreover, I think Wesley is right that shame plays an important role according Aristotle's theory in understanding the moral features of a tragic dilemma for both the individual and the community. I wonder, however, if presenting an Aristotelian notion of shame in terms of navigating deontological and utilitarian concerns in the best way to present the problem if we are to get at what Aristotle is really saying. I understand that there is a certain impetus to do so because commentators in the literature draw on tragic dilemmas and dirty hands situations in these terms but as you point out, the number of things that Aristotle says are in some sense categorically wrong are few and far between. Since this is the case, isn't it more likely that any tragic dilemma or instance in which we should feel shame will arise with respect to situations that the majority of people believe is always wrong, whether they are in fact wrong, in some other more robust sense? That being the case, won't we will be compelled to act and feel shame more often (if we are the virtuous or conditionally virtuous person) because of societally relative rules that are only Kantian on a superficial level? In other words, bringing in Kantian (to say nothing of consequentialist) conceptions of these situations seems to me to risk suggesting Aristotle thinks of things in a categorical fashion in the way in which we do as thus obscuring the importance of this aspect of what Aristotle actually thinks about the moral phenomena that is shame that you're trying so hard (and have done such a good job of) elucidating?

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Now, I want to change tact a bit and to take a moment to praise Wesley for incorporating a contemporary issue into our understanding of Aristotle's ethics. Even if what I've said above about obscuring Aristotle's phenomenological understanding of shame holds water, it may be that bringing in real world considerations and that bringing in the way in which we tend to speak as moderns in our discussions of ethical theory is important enough that it may be worth the cost of not seeing Aristotle exactly as clearly as we would like. This is especially the case because torture seems to me to be a poignant and important example from our political lives because of the serious and realistic danger that allowing our government to unaccountably hurt anyone poses for our own future lives whether we are aiming to live a virtuous existence, trying to follow the correct categorical rules or trying to see to it that the consequences of our actions are worth their costs.

So, on that political note, I'd like to challenge you and your sources view that the tragic dilemma is something that is relatively rare because I think that showing that this is the case actually makes your argument more relevant and more true to Aristotelian ethics. That being said, my first reason to think that tragic dilemmas are actually all that rare is that, much along the same lines as what I've said already about societally determined categorical rules, the number of things we affirm that we simply don't do and would be right to be ashamed of doing is potentially higher than the number of things that in another sense are categorically wrong. Depending on culture mores, a great deal many things may seem to disrupt the fabric of society in a way that good lead to situations where we need to do the all things considered correct thing even if it goes against another moral concern.

My next line of reasoning, however, is an outgrowth of the recognition by Aristotle that even in the ideal polity there is still A) Inherent inequality concerning what today we might call socio-economic factors, and B) Some form of political compulsion to get people to go along with societal rules. This being the case, an important part of human life, even in the best society, will include compelling people

in a way that is outside their control. If, then, it is the case that the tyrant counts as an agent that can generate a tragic dilemma, unless some counter argument be found, there doesn't seem to be any reason to exclude any kind of political or societal compulsion that is well and truly beyond an agent's immediate control from being a source of a "dirty hands" "all things considered right" "tragic dilemma".

To make this point more vivid imagine, for instance, that you have a spouse and two children. Your spouse has a lucrative job and you are living as *eudaimon* and virtuous life as a philosopher could hope. However, while you're still A.B.D, the worst happens and your spouse loses employment because they've fallen terribly, cripplingly ill and you find yourself badly in need of money for their medical care. You, of course, already get some kind of wage from your university for working for them but in order to make up the short fall, even with personal budget cuts, you need to take on a course overload as an adjunct professor at a for profit college. Only, doing so poses a problem for you: you have a well-founded moral objection to participating in the fleecing of the underprivileged. Or, maybe you understand that this isn't one of the things that is categorically wrong like adultery, murder or torture but the academic circles you find yourself in do think that working in these sorts of places are just despicable, period. "All things considered", however, you know you need to help save your spouse from their illness and the integrity of the family that lets you live a *eudaimon* life.

Now, maybe this isn't as serious or common as having to choose between sacrificing your daughter to the gods or letting your daughter and the whole Greek fleet perish but empirically speaking these sorts of "acts of god" (or should I say gods) can still leave you coming out with dirty (albeit not as dirty) hands and some amount of justified shame. Consider all the factors that go into it: the culture of the academy is certainly not in your immediate control. The laws and policies that govern your wages aren't in your immediate control. Your spouse's illness certainly isn't in your immediate control. The fact that you or your spouse's professional lives are on such shaky ground isn't in your immediate control. All

these things are more in the control of the long term behavior of the whole polity or nature and involve a degree of bad moral luck.

Moreover, once we admit to this kind of compulsion as a condition for setting up a tragic dilemma, much worse and, unfortunately, all the more common, dilemmas might be tallied in any non-ideal society we actually live in: Imagine this time that you're a part of a minority or oppressed group in society who can choose to hide their status as part of that ground in order to participate as one of society's better enfranchised members. In doing so, you could gather everything you need to live an otherwise *eudaimon* life: you can get a good education, a good reputation, support your family, have a rich intellectual life, develop otherwise good habits and maybe even work in some way to help fix the plight of those who can't hide their minority status in the way you can. However, it would mean, every day, forever, until you die or society changes that you have to at the very least lie by omission and oftentimes outright lie to people that you know, sometimes even your closest friends and family members.

Now, from an Aristotelian perspective I recognize we might argue that because of their circumstances this person has such rotten moral luck that they can never live a fully *eudaimon* life because their society is set up in a way not conducive to that life insofar as they don't have access to a particular virtue but that doesn't seem to lessen the tragedy or dilemma of the situation if the person is otherwise morally well grounded. Again, "All things considered" living an oppressed life with none of the material conditions to live in a *eudaimon* way and no means to help others in your condition is definitely worse "All things considered" than telling a lie and maybe even lots of lies over a long time. For my money, this seems to be the sort of tragic dilemma that people with unorthodox sexualities have been experiencing for hundreds of years in one form or another, and I doubt anyone who was a half decent person in such a scenario feels good about having lied to anyone and everyone for a lifetime or even some people some of the time, if they could help it.