Causality and Necessity in *Timaeus*

[ABSTRACT]

What is/are the teleological agent(s) on Plato’s account where “teleological agent” is understood as the cause (i.e. the reason) a particular becomes an instantiation of a specific being? To answer this question I investigate three possible entities that feasibly fit this criteria: Forms, the divine model coupled with Reason, and Necessity. Gail Fine suggests Forms are teleological causes because they are what motivate ends, but I agree with scholars such as Fiona Leah and Julia Annas who argue that Forms cannot fulfill the teleological role because Forms cannot self-actualize, which would have to be the case if they were to be teleological agents. Other scholars, most notably T.K. Johansen, argue that the rational cause in conjunction with the divine model produce all teleology. To a certain degree, I do not disagree with Johansen’s assessment because the intelligible is necessary for any sort of actualized being in the cosmos; however, I contend that Necessity is the ultimate teleological agent since Reason must *persuade* Necessity. Using evidence from *Timaeus*, I will argue that Necessity restricts Reason, and, because of this, Necessity regulates all teleological accounts of the physical world.
Causality and Necessity in *Timaeus*

In this paper, I will argue that Plato’s metaphysical ontology, as it appears in *Timaeus*, suggests that a being’s telos is realized in the natural (i.e. physical) world because of Necessity; not Forms or the combination of the divine model and the intelligible cause. Before the investigation can properly unfold, there are two key parameters that need to be established.

The first parameter is the way in which I will engage the term “cause” (αἰτία). Some scholars opt for reading αἰτία as “because,” rather than “cause.”¹ “Because” suggests that “αἰτία” is a post-instantiation explanation for why a thing has a specific nature. I in no way wish to cheapen these scholars’ claim on this issue because the evidence is compelling in their favor; instead, I merely wish to augment this view from post-instantiation to pre-instantiation such that “αἰτία” is “the reason why something will be of such and such a nature” instead of “the reason why something is (has become) of such and such a nature.”²

The second parameter is how I will engage the concept of “cause” with respect to teleology.³ A.E. Taylor identifies two fundamental positions in *Timaeus*: “(a) that the sensible world, being sensible, ‘becomes,’ or, as we might say, is a world of ‘happenings’ or ‘events;’ (b)

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² Some may question how this distinction is ultimately relevant because the two views may be of the same thing. I assure that it is not. The reason they are not is pretty much the basis for the entire discussion (or at least the first section). The post-instantiation view of “αἰτία” will result as an acquisition of a specific Form. What is the cause for something to be of such and such a nature? The Form. The view I am proposing to work with, the pre-instantiation, is the cause that leads to the Form becoming instantiated in an object. So, I am searching for what is the cause for a Form to be instantiated in the first place. Once the Form is instantiated, something is of a specific nature because it possesses a specific Form.
³ The way in which I will engage “teleology” throughout the paper is in the sense that every particular entity that possesses some being instantiated in it in the physical world will have a purpose or telos it fulfills. To have a teleology an object must have a telos or purpose in the first place. So, the teleological agent will be that which allows/instantiates the telos in a particular and allows for that particular’s potential to be actualized. This understanding of teleology differs from how some of the scholars I reference interpret teleology; thus, I do not propose that any of the sources used here produce unfounded conclusions, I aim to take their conclusions and reformulate them through this augmented view of teleology. I recognize that my rejection of varying views on this issue are somewhat attributable to this scope alone, but my intention is not to invalidate these scholars but rather propose another lens in which Plato’s metaphysical ontology can be, and should be, viewed through.
that whatever ‘becomes’ has a cause, by which Timaeus means that it is the product of an agent.”

Taylor’s identification of these two points sets the stage for the analysis to follow. The sensible world is a world of becoming with “happenings” and “events,” and those “happenings” and “events” must have some sort of cause, or reason, for why they occur. What is that cause?

Given these parameters, I suggest there are three possible sources responsible for teleological commitments in the physical world: Forms, the divine model (i.e. all Forms and their interconnected natures with one another) with Reason, and Necessity. Both Forms and the divine model have been put forward as solutions to the central question I propose; the third is a scarcely recognized option. Of course, all of these factors play fundamental roles in teleology, but I will argue that Necessity plays the greatest of roles because it is the cause which ultimately allows for being in the world of becoming.

I. **Forms**

Gail Fine suggests that Forms direct a particular’s change in ontological state (i.e. Forms actualize ever-changing potentials in substance). Fine states: “In the Timaeus the teleological role of Forms is extended to the natural world. For there, Plato introduces the demiurge as the creator of the cosmos… He must, then, have looked to the best possible model to guide his creating; and these are the Forms… Once again, then, Forms are paradigms, or goals aimed at, and so are T-aitia.”

Fine’s positioning Forms in the teleological role reflects this idea that Forms are goals. Goals are aimed towards; thus, they motivate ends. So, being(a), simultaneously in the state of becoming(b), must draw upon some Form as its paradigm for order and structure; namely, the paradigm Form associated with being(b).

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4 See A.E. Taylor “Timaeus and Critias” pg. 440.
5 See Gail Fine “Forms as Causes: Plato and Aristotle” pg. 394. The term “T-aitia” is used in reference to “teleological/final cause.” Fine’s investigation uses some Aristotelian language and this is one of those cases.
Fine’s position is *prima facie* acceptable, although, it should be noted that her approach to “aitia” coincides with its interpretation as “because,” rather than the one I put forward in the beginning. However, for the sake of the argument, simply, if every becoming must participate in a Form to ultimately achieve being, then Forms are necessary for teleology. I do not argue this point. What I do argue is that Forms being necessary for teleology does not make them teleological causes, which is what Fine claims. Do Forms possess the necessary influential capabilities to engender *becoming* to become *being*, or are they just goals? I do not believe Forms can be teleological agents, and I am not alone on this issue. Julia Annas, in a discussion regarding causality (primarily in *Phaedo*), states: “what [Forms] explain is the possession of a quality, not the causal history of how that quality came to be possessed. Plato’s own later account in the *Timaeus* underlines how distinct these issues are. For there he does try to provide an improved account of coming-to-be and the world’s causal history, while apparently abandoning the search for the explanations which in the *Phaedo* are provided by Forms.”

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6 Due to restrictions of length, I go rather quickly over why Forms cannot be the agent of teleology because many scholars have already written on this subject. All of which arrive to the same conclusion for the same fundamental principle that teleology requires a change in state and Forms cannot undergo a change in state. Some of these scholars are cited below and include Julia Annas “Aristotle on Inefficient Causes,” Gregory Vlastos “Reasons and Causes,” and Fiona Leigh “Restless Forms and Changeless Causes.”

7 In the quote above from Fine, it demonstrates that Fine is couching her discussion in Aristotelian jargon (i.e. T-aitia is a reference to Aristotle’s four causes: material, formal, efficient, and teleological), so I take Fine to assess Forms going beyond the formal cause and into the teleological cause, implying substantially different consequences.

8 This phrasing, albeit odd, is the best way to state what is going on for Plato’s ontological account. Since everything exists in the physical world, everything is *always* in a state of becoming; nothing is always fixed or pure being. However, if Forms are in particulars, particulars must have some sort of being which is fixed. This being is not eternal, but it is a state of being which can be said to represent and instantiate a particular Form. No Form should be considered to be in a state of becoming yet also be because a paradoxical paradigm gets established where things yet to be are somehow, at the same time, being. Instead, the more realistic approach to compensate for Forms needing to be fixed in particulars yet allow for particulars to be entirely fluid in the world of becoming is to say that Forms must have a threshold for being instantiated in a particular. There must be something of an “operational limit” that permits Forms to be instantiated over periods of never ending change in a particular. This is why I believe the discussion taking place in this paper is an important one, because ultimately, if this view of an “operational limit” is adopted (which is the only view I can conceive of myself), the telos of a particular (i.e. the capabilities it possesses or enacts) is the measure of whether or not a Form exists in a particular. Thus, the teleological agent should be culpable for all of Plato’s ontology. Of course, there could be some pushback to my view or other views I cannot conceive of presently; however, moving forward, this is the understanding that should be used while reading this paper.

9 See Julia Annas “Aristotle on Inefficient Causes” pg. 318.
Annas aims to convey in her argument is that Forms are *fixed* and *eternal*, which inhibits any sort of becoming. If Forms are fixed and eternal, then they should be in a constant state of being; yet, teleology, as outlined previously, is an account for a becoming achieving being. Anything that is fixed and eternal could never be in a state of becoming (which is the state of all physical things), it always *is* (in the noumenal world).10 Because of this, Forms could not possibly be the teleological cause for the cosmos because Forms are changeless. However, Forms should not be entirely condemned, especially since Forms are necessary to all being. As a consequence, some scholars assert that the divine model coupled with Reason (αἰρία) is the solution to the teleological question because it combines both Forms and a rational cause. However, these scholars also run into issues.

II. Divine Model/Reason (αἰρία)

The divine model encompasses not only the composite of all the Forms, but also all the interrelating natures existing amongst the Forms; not just individual, independent beings, but the relationships that those beings have with each other, which creates the entire fabric of rationality. This is imparted onto the physical world through the rational cause (νοῦς).11 For example, the Form of *blueness* and the Form of *yellowness* are independent Forms in themselves, but there is also the Form of *greenness* which has natural ties to the Forms of both blueness and yellowness (i.e. blue mixed with yellow can produce green). This relationship exists innately in the divine model. Essentially, the divine model is the interconnected web of all Forms with all Forms.

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10 In Fiona Leigh’s investigation of Sophist, Leigh notes that the characters arrive to the conclusion: “only things in the realm of becoming undergo action and passion; things in the realm of being do not… The realm of becoming, by contrast, is for them the realm of change.” See Fiona Leigh “Restless Forms and Changeless Causes” pg. 245. Also, Gregory Vlastos claims that it is an absurdity for Forms to be spatio-temporal causes because of the fact Forms would have to govern over multiple particulars as both what *is* of a certain Form and the negation of it. Such a structure of possession and want with respect to the Forms could not account for any sort of becoming. See Gregory Vlastos “Reasons and Causes” pg. 304.

11 See Plato *Tim.* 28e.

10 See Plato *Tim.* 47e.
The best textual evidence for believing that the divine model is the teleological cause for the cosmos comes after the proposed question: to what “paradigms” (παραδειγμάτων) did the Craftsman look?12 Timaeus states:

Was it after that which is self-identical and uniform, or after that which has come into existence? Now if so be that this Cosmos is beautiful and its Constructor good, it is plain that he fixed his gaze to the Eternal; but if otherwise (which is an impious supposition), his gaze was on that which has come into existence. But it is clear to everyone that his gaze was on the Eternal; for the Cosmos is the fairest of all that has come into existence, and He the best of all the Causes. So having in this wise come into existence, it has been constructed after the pattern of that which is apprehensible by reason and thought and is self-identical.14

So, what Timaeus is stating here is that there are two different models the Craftsman could look towards in reference to production: either the physical world (i.e. the world of becoming – γεγονός) or the noumenal world (i.e. the realm of the eternal - ἀίδιον). Now, two issues need to be discussed further from this passage: a) how can one be sure that Timaeanus is speaking of the divine model and b) what role does the Craftsman have in respect to the divine model?

The first issue is rather easy to respond to. The intelligible realm must be identified with the “Eternal” (ἀίδιον) because, as noted, the passage is concerned with what sort of “models” are under consideration here. The term for “models” is “παραδειγμάτων” which has great significance with respect to Plato’s Forms. Aristotle identifies Plato’s Forms as paradigms stating:

Therefore, it is apparent that not one Form [εἴδος] is bound as a paradigm [παράδειγμα].

What Aristotle wants to say is that Forms are not as Plato posits them (i.e. as paradigms), but are only in particulars. Aristotle’s reasoning for or against Plato’s position is not of interest, the

12 See Plato Tim. 28e.
13 See Plato Tim. 29a
14 Credit for this translation goes to R.G. Bury.
15 See Aristotle Met. 1034a1-2.
quote provides sufficient reason to accept that “Forms” and “paradigms” are interchangeable terms.

From the passage at 29a (cited above) there is even more textual evidence which evinces the “divine model” as the directing agent for the Craftsman’s instantiation process. Not only does Plato appeal to the “Eternal,” which is the state of all Forms, but also to what is apprehensible by both “reason” (λόγῳ) and “thought” (φρονήσει) and always “like same” (κατὰ ταὐτὰ). The dialectic in Republic Books VI and VII provides sufficient evidence that Forms are that which are apprehensible through “reason” and “thought” (amidst countless other pieces of textual evidence), so that seems to parallel the text of Timaeus. Then, “like same” is of the same nature as “towards self” (i.e. καθ᾿ αὑτὸ). In Philebus, “καθ᾿ αὑτὸ” is used to denote the eternal and changeless class of being, just as in Timaeus.16 Even Aristotle identifies “καθ᾿ αὑτὸ” with Plato’s Forms.17 Thus, the quote above from Timaeus clearly constitutes Form-talk.

This leads into the second issue: what is the role of the Craftsman? Or, more specifically, why is the Craftsman not the teleological agent? There can be no doubt that the Craftsman plays a pivotal role with respect to causality; it is apparent from the quote above when Timaeus says that the Craftsman is “the best cause” (ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων). However, the Craftsman is not a teleological cause (i.e. final cause); the Craftsman is an efficient cause. It is important to distinguish the two. Being able to produce does not mean that what is produced are purposeful ends. Creating existents or beings does not determine ends just as an oak tree does not control the destiny of all the acorns it releases upon the earth; creation is like putting the chess pieces into place, not determining the outcome of the match itself. This does not mean the Craftsman is expendable; the Craftsman is necessary because without efficient causes there are no beings, and

16 See Plato Phl. 53d.
17 See Met. 1060a11-13.
without beings there exists no teleology. However, whether a potential being gets actualized in a particular is out of the Craftsman’s hands, it is a product of whatever is mandated by the divine model. T.K. Johansen notes: “A craftsman is required for making becoming like being. Becoming on its own does not ‘have it in it’ to be or bring about something beautiful.” This is somewhat the same story as before regarding Forms. Forms are not able to actualize themselves in the state of becoming because Forms are pure being; becoming cannot spontaneously take on being, something must cultivate it. Johansen likens the Craftsman to a conveyer of information, essentially an input-output machine. Ultimately, Johansen argues that the intelligible cause (i.e. the actualizing of the divine model) acts through the Craftsman to impart order.

Even though Johansen makes some key points, the divine model (as it is imparted by Reason) cannot be what finalizes teleology because, just like Forms, the divine model is entirely potential. To return to a previous example, if the Craftsman is the cause identifiable with putting the chess pieces on the board, the divine model is all the rules that regulate possible moves and possible outcomes of a match, but is not the individual moves and outcomes themselves. The intelligible cause will only reflect the stipulating of the predetermined rules (e.g. bishops moving diagonally, rooks moving vertically and horizontally, etc.) inherent to the game.

III. Necessity

Before being able to make my case for Necessity, I must elaborate on two important points: a) that Necessity is described as a *wandering* cause and b) Reason *persuades* (πειθοῦς) Necessity.

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19 When I say that the divine model and the Forms are “entirely potential” I do not mean that they do not possess *actual being*, because Forms and the divine model embody being itself. My use of the term “potential” is to say that the Forms and the divine model possess the *potential* to be instantiated (i.e. actualized) in the physical world. To say that Forms and the divine model are not potential in this sense would be to say that the divine model and all the Forms are actual in the physical world which would wholly contradict the fact that the physical world is in a state of perpetual becoming since the intelligible (i.e. Forms and the divine model) are fixed and unchanging.
First, Timaeus distinguishes two principal causes: Reason (νοῦς) and Necessity (ἀνάγκης). Second, Timaeus also distinguishes the cause pertaining to the Intelligent Nature (ἐμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίας) apart from the auxiliary cause (συνάιτια). Then, finally, Timaeus describes Necessity as taking on the form of a wandering cause (πλανωμένης εἰδος αἰτίας).

This begs the question: what are the roles for the lesser three causes?

In Johansen’s words: “An intelligent cause is informed by the results it brings about. It acts in a certain way because so acting brings about certain results.” Basically, the intelligible cause is an extension of reason that establishes the structure and order for all being.

Skipping over the auxiliary cause for the moment, the wandering cause becomes a point of contention inasmuch as it is not clear what “wandering” means or how Necessity “wanders.” Necessity should be fixed because if something is necessary, it means it could not be any other way. Johansen argues that the “wandering” aspect is due to the cause being “aimless” in that “it is not directed towards the aims set by the intelligible cause.” Only the intelligible will produce truly consequential results (i.e. instantiated being); Necessity should be viewed as “cause and effect” without the provision that a being (i.e. a Form) must be manifestly instantiated. In other words, the intelligible cause imparts all the necessary ontological transitions that a particular instantiation of being(a) must undergo to be actualized as being(b), whereas Necessity does not possess an ontological compass, yet maintains the entire deterministic fabric of the world of becoming. An example of Necessity would be that an acorn falls to the earth instead of

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20 See Plato Tim. 48a.
21 See Plato Tim. 46d-e.
22 See Plato Tim. 48b.
23 See Johansen “Necessity and Teleology” pg. 94-95.
24 I interpret “auxiliary causes” as the combination of Reason and Necessity, but neither fully one nor the other. Allan Silverman seems to put forth a similar account for this interpretation. For another account of Necessity and Reason as causes see Allan Silverman The Dialectic of Essence Chapter VII.
25 See Johansen “Necessity and Teleology” pg. 93.
26 See Johansen “Necessity and Teleology” pg. 94. See Francis Cornford “Plato’s Cosmology” as another source which delineates the intention behind “wandering” with respect to Necessity.
ascending into the outer space. Just because the acorn falls to earth does not mean it will
ultimately become an oak tree because the acorn could very well fall on a concrete parking lot or
be eaten by a squirrel, not land in fertile soil. Thus, Necessity regulates the determinate qualities
of the physical world, but does not have the intelligible foresight to see the ontological end.
Now, where I will press on later is the fact that just because it does not see the end does not mean
it does not regulate it.

Returning to the auxiliary causes, auxiliary causes will be those causes that are a
byproduct of the intelligent cause persuading the wandering cause towards being, but are not the
finalized telos of a particular. Auxiliary causes are only the causes which set others in motion.27
Going back to the acorn looking to actualize its potential to become an oak tree, the act of the
acorn falling from the tree towards the ground would be the doing of the wandering cause. For
the acorn to land in a suitable place to germinate and start to receive necessary nutrients (i.e.
water, nitrogen, etc.) would be auxiliary causes; they are all necessary for the acorn to turn into
an oak tree, but do not provide the complete actualization of the oak tree by themselves.

Taking a step back and looking at the big picture, why are there these three causes? The
intelligible cause corresponds to the divine model, the wandering cause corresponds to the
physical world devoid of intelligibility, and the auxiliary cause corresponds to the mixture of the
two. This “corresponding” nature between cause and what the cause is set over is such that each
cause has a particular teleological ability that is sui generis with respect to the other two causes.
The bigger picture becomes that an auxiliary cause does not have the ability to realize the divine
model in its totality (that is the duty of the intelligible cause) nor the ability to cause the
determinate qualities innate in physical nature (that is the duty of the wandering cause); but, on
the same token, neither the intelligible cause nor the wandering cause can intermingle and

27 See Plato Tim. 46e.
produce the necessary intermediate steps that auxiliary causes perform to bring about being in the world of becoming. Viewing the account from this perspective is beneficial because it is clear how Necessity is set over the world of becoming. What does this mean? It means that the intelligible cause is not wielding Necessity like a tool, but is negotiating with it so that order (being) can be established in it. In principle, being is attempting to “unnaturally”\(^{28}\) supervene on the world of becoming, but can only do so if Necessity permits. This is why Reason must persuade Necessity.

So, what is the significance of this “persuasion” aspect? Timaeus states:

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καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀναλογίων περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὰς κινήσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις πανταχῇ τὸν θεόν, ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἔκοψα πειθείᾳ τε φύσις ὑπείκεν, ταύτῃ πάντῃ δὲ ἀκριβείᾳ ἀποτελεσθεὶσσον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ συνηρμόσθαι ταῦτα ἀνὰ λόγον.\(^{29}\)
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And, moreover, as regards the numerical proportions which govern their masses and motions and their other qualities, we must conceive that God realized these everywhere with exactness, in so far as the nature of Necessity submitted voluntarily or under persuasion, and thus ordered all in harmonious proportion.\(^{30}\)

The ontological aspect of the quote demonstrates that the being of the divine model is conveyed by the Craftsman through proportions (ἀναλογίων), so being is imparted by way of the Pythagorean model of mathematics. Why is something of such and such a nature? Because it has a harmonious (συνηρμόσθαι) proportion akin to a certain paradigm of being (i.e. a Form). How does this occur? Necessity submits voluntarily (ἔκοψα) or is persuaded (πεισθεῖσα).

Despite the wording, one should not perceive Necessity to have psychological agency because it submits “voluntarily.” Nor is Necessity something that should be viewed as possessing a cognitive deliberation process deciding whether or not the intelligible cause has persuaded it. As Johansen notes: “Timaeus refers to the persuasion of necessity as voluntary in so far as necessity is made to behave in accordance with its own nature.”\(^{31}\)

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\(^{28}\) I put “unnaturally” in quotes here because one should not take “unnatural” to mean that being is unnatural. The use of “unnatural” here is to emphasize that the physical world is *naturally* in a state of becoming.

\(^{29}\) See Plato *Tim.* 56c.

\(^{30}\) Credit for this translation goes to R.G. Bury.

\(^{31}\) See T.K. Johansen “Necessity and Teleology” pg. 99.
the intelligible cause (via the Craftsman) activates being in the world of becoming by playing to
Necessity’s natural propensities. The intelligent cause cannot *force* (βία) a paradigm being onto
Necessity (i.e. in the world of becoming) if the elements targeted to take on a being are not apt
for it. Thus, the intelligent cause is limited by the capabilities of the natural world (i.e.
Necessity). To return once more to the example of the chess match, the intelligent cause is what
constitutes all the possible moves that any given piece could make; however, in the very
beginning of a match, a pawn occupies the space immediately in front and a knight in the
position immediately to the right of a rook; thus, at that point a rook cannot actualize the
potential to move in either direction, the rook has become necessarily restricted. The restriction
of the rook is not intelligible, it is a product of its particular position on the board with respect to
other pieces. Once those spaces open up, the rook is no longer necessarily restricted and can
actualize the being given to it by the divine model to the extent that the board will allow.

To illustrate this point further and express the idea in terms of the Craftsman, take the
classic oak tree example again. The teleological goal for the Craftsman is to instantiate the Form
“oak tree” in the actual world; however, Necessity does not permit the immediate instantiation of
the tree. Instead, the instantiation of the Form “oak tree” begins its journey as an acorn. Now, the
fact that there is a mediated journey (i.e. steps – auxiliary causes – necessary to the Form’s
actualization) rather than an immediate instantiation suggests that something restricts the
Craftsman. That restriction is most likely the result of one of two issues: a) the necessary
elements needed for construction (i.e. fire, air, water, earth) of the oak tree are not available in
the physical reality at the time the Form is attempted to be instantiated by the Craftsman or b) the
elements (i.e. fire, air, water, earth), or laws of nature in general, possess physical limitations
which makes immediate instantiation impossible. Either way, Necessity restricts the Craftsman
in such a way that immediate instantiation of a Form is impossible unless doing so is within the bounds set by Necessity.

IV. Conclusion: Reason or Necessity?

Given what has been said up to this point, it can be asserted that both Reason (i.e. the divine model and cause) and Necessity are required for teleology. To be sure, both Necessity and Reason are required for teleology because without Reason there could be no being in the physical world (i.e. the domain of Necessity) because the physical world is strictly becoming. Also, Reason could not be at an impasse with Necessity because Necessity overrules Reason when it comes to the world of becoming; this is why the physical world is prone to flux instead of order. Order must be maintained through Necessity’s cooperation with Reason, flux, on the other hand, is the default state of the physical world. So, if both Reason and Necessity are necessary causes for teleology, how can it be decided which is the ultimate teleological agent?

Johansen believes that, in some respects, the intelligent cause is identifiable with Aristotle’s teleological cause (i.e. T-aitia) in particular because: a) the cause gives purpose to the ends it serves, b) both take that purpose to be directed towards good ends, and c) the cause is prior to both the causation and explanation of a particular being. Johansen also asserts that final causes “operate as aitiai via god’s intelligence” and that “final causes presuppose the agency of an intellect.” So, Johansen is arguing that the cosmos needs the Craftsman and the Craftsman works using the divine model to produce teleology. Therefore, teleology would be a product of the divine model.

While Johansen is not wrong, the “final cause” Johansen is detailing is radically different from the one this paper looks to identify. Looking back to the criteria established in the

32 That is not to say that the Forms are not required, but the Forms are entailed by the divine model.
introduction; the aim of this paper is to identify the teleological agent that is both: a) compatible with the pre-instantiation view (i.e. that which will produce a teleology, not that which explains a teleology) and b) the cause that engenders “happenings” and “events” in the world of becoming. Johansen’s appeal to “final causes” is driven mainly towards explanation (i.e. the post-instantiation view) and goal setting. Johansen thereby neglects the fundamental necessity of Necessity because, in the end, Necessity meets the criteria more so than the divine model. Necessity is the cause set over all becoming, and since all teleology is rooted in the world of becoming, Necessity must be the ultimate agent that permits being and allows for teleology to be realized in physical particulars.

While it is true that, without the divine model and the Craftsman there can be no teleology, Necessity allows Reason to impart being into the world of becoming. If a nature is unsuited to transmit the paradigms into the world of becoming, those paradigms will not be instantiated because Necessity will not allow it. Once again, this is a matter of restriction. Reason is restricted by Necessity. Reason must persuade Necessity. This “restriction” signifies that being (in the world of becoming) is dependent upon Necessity most of all. As was said earlier, the divine model is pure being (i.e. fully actual) in the noumenal world. The divine model itself never goes from becoming to being, that only occurs in the physical world. Teleology was taken to be “events” or “happenings;” because of this, the divine model could never undergo such changes because the divine model is always fixed and never changes. What does regulate “events” and “happenings;” what causes them to happen? Necessity.

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35 Brisson will echo most of the sentiments already presented before. He touches on Necessity but assigns it a secondary role as something wielded by the Craftsman who is directed by the intelligible model. Brisson goes awry because he attempts to go beyond nature. By going beyond nature for his account, Brisson misses Necessity’s place in nature (i.e. the mixture called physical reality) he over extends the role of the intelligible model. Ultimately, Brisson will suggest that the intelligible model assigns mathematical ratios to the intelligible Forms so that they can become instantiated in physical reality. See Luc Brisson “Plato’s Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics.”
References


