

# Free Rein of Kant's *Free Play*

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## Abstract

It appears to be a result of the principles laid out in Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* that all things can be beautiful. This is a problem for Kant not only because he denies this possibility, but also because it strips his theory of usefulness. I consider an attempt by Hud Hudson to provide an account of ugliness within Kant's framework, which would provide a way out of the apparent dilemma. However, I claim that Hudson's account falls prey to the same subjectivity in Kant's theory that is responsible for the problem in the first place.

Kant's work on aesthetics is titled *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.<sup>1 2</sup> His treatise is unique in this area of philosophy because he devotes only a very little part of the work to art. Instead, he is mostly concerned with nature. He tries to give an account of the aesthetic judgments we make by describing what it is about nature that gives rise to them. He considers judgments of beauty, sublimity, and teleology. It is with the first two that we will be concerned.

One of the most important claims that Kant makes is that beauty is not a characteristic of the object of our judgment. If we call a tree beautiful, we are not saying very much about the tree at all. Kant does think that we are saying *something* about it, but more of that in a moment. Strictly speaking, though, the judgment of beauty is a subjective one, that has to do with the

relations of our faculties of mind to each other. Similarly, calling something *sublime* is not to pick out anything about the object, but rather to identify an object that brings about a certain state of affairs in our minds. I want to look in particular at Kant's account of beauty, and see if we can solve this apparent problem: The way Kant describes the judgment of beauty seems to make it possible for anything and everything to be beautiful with the exception of the sublime. This is a problem for two reasons. First, Kant himself clearly did not think that *all* things were beautiful.<sup>3</sup> In fact, especially when it comes to art, his standards for entry into this class seem quite stringent. If his theory leads to all things being beautiful, that shows that he misunderstood the implications of his own ideas. The second problem is that an aesthetic theory that yields the

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Marcus Verhaegh as well as the other conference participants for their insightful comments on this paper.

<sup>2</sup> The page number references to the work throughout are to the standard German edition of Kant's works, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*. Quotations are from Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

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<sup>3</sup> Hud Hudson points out that Kant seems committed to both objects that bring pleasure and those that bring displeasure. See: Hudson, Hud, "The Significance of an Analytic of the Ugly in Kant's Deduction of Pure Judgments of Taste." *Kant's Aesthetics*, vol. 1, ed. Ralf Meerbote (Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1991), p. 87. Kant tells us the former are beautiful, therefore the latter must be something else, though exactly what Kant does not make explicit (See for example p. 220.) Hudson has his own theories on this point as we shall see.

result of universal beauty is not going to be very helpful or attractive. At an intuitive level, we certainly think that there are ugly things, and a good aesthetic theory will presumably give us some guidance in distinguishing these from the beautiful.

We will proceed by first giving an overview of Kant's theory, paying particular attention to where the problem seems to lie. We will then consider whether we can free Kant from the apparent dilemma by looking at an account of the ugly suggested by Hud Hudson. In the end we will try to show that Kant cannot escape the possibility of universal beauty, but rather that it is a natural consequence of his theory.

### I. Kant's Theory of Beauty

Instead of going directly to Kant's discussion of beauty, we should first set it within the broader context of his ideas about the mind as a whole. Kant divides the functions of the mind into three broad categories: cognition, feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and desire. Cognition is further divided into reason, judgment, and understanding. Kant argues that the understanding provides what he calls the *a priori principles* for cognition. These principles are explored in the first *Critique* and are essentially the conditions for thought in general.<sup>4</sup> They include concepts, which allow us to organize experience by subsuming the particular under the general. This function is performed by our judgment, which, as Kant tries to show in the third *Critique*, supplies the *a priori* principles for the faculty of pleasure and displeasure. Reason, finally, is that which allows us to see the implications for our actions of the understanding's

general requirements.<sup>5</sup> Kant claims in the second *Critique* that the understanding provides the *a priori* principles for the faculty of desire.<sup>6</sup> His three *Critiques*, then, provide what he considered an exhaustive account of the faculties of the mind. The third *Critique*, concerning pleasure and displeasure, contains his exploration of beauty.

The basic outline of Kant's account of beauty is fairly simple. We have said that judgment is the faculty for subsuming particulars under general concepts. For example, when we see a spherical object, we may recognize it as being an instance of the concept *ball*. This is not, however, the way that we recognize beauty. Notice that when we recognize a sphere as a ball this does not bring pleasure, and yet recognizing something as beautiful does. Kant thinks that what is going on in the latter case is that we do not place the beautiful object under a specific concept, but rather recognize something about the form of the object. In particular, we see that the form of the object is suitable to our faculty of judgment in that it looks like the kind of thing that will fit under a concept, though in this instance we are unable to say which one. Kant calls this the *purposiveness* of the object, which indicates that it seems to be intended for our cognition. The pleasure enters the picture in what Kant terms the *free play* of the imagination, which is our trying out of various concepts to see if we can find something adequate to the object at hand. We are conscious of our freedom to assign a concept, in other words to designate meaning, and this brings us pleasure. We call the objects that display this general purposiveness *beautiful*. It is important to note that Kant stresses that beauty is not based on any concept.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For example the notion of causality allows us to make our experience coherent by apprehending connections between the events in it.

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<sup>5</sup> For example, Reason works out implications of rationality such as consistency. If I act a certain way upon a certain set of considerations, I must allow that it is legitimate for you to do so also when in the same circumstances.

<sup>6</sup> It is this relationship that gives rise to the requirements of morality.

<sup>7</sup> Kant, 5:282.

This means there will not be a set of rules that will tell us what is beautiful and what is not. We cannot prove that something is beautiful.<sup>8</sup> Rather, each must determine this for himself by experiencing the object. If it exhibits purposiveness and stimulates free play, then it is beautiful.

We must add an important caveat here. Kant cautions that we cannot assume an object is beautiful just because looking at it brings us pleasure. This is because an object that is not beautiful can nevertheless bring us pleasure if we are concerned with it in some way. For example, someone may think that the American flag is beautiful because it pleases her to look at it. In reality, the pleasure is due not to beauty but to feelings of patriotism that the flag arouses. For this reason Kant stipulates that a genuine judgment of beauty has to be disinterested: we must be personally indifferent towards the object that we attempt to judge.<sup>9</sup> If we are not in fact indifferent, we need to set aside our feelings in order to make a proper judgment.

The *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, as already noted, spends very little time on the subject of art. This is probably because Kant takes nature as the paradigm case of beauty. In the products of nature we see purpose everywhere: each structure of each organism seems fitted to some purpose. Yet Kant thinks that this purpose is not really present in nature, but is imposed onto nature by us. We must see nature as purposive in order to make sense of it and order it. Thus, purposiveness is the starting point for empirical science.<sup>10</sup> This purposiveness gives our imagination the occasion for the free play that grounds the pleasure of beauty. Nature really has no purpose,

but seems as though it does. The products of humans, on the other hand, do have purposes. Thus art does not allow as much free play as nature does because, unlike nature, there was some concept involved in its creation. In order to make this distinction clear let's consider two examples. On the one hand, imagine vines growing on the face of a rock wall. There is no concept involved in the arrangement of the vines; they simply grew the way they did at random. We find them beautiful because they nevertheless seem suggestive of *something* and our imagination plays with exactly how to see them. On the other hand, imagine a portrait painting. It may be beautiful, but our imagination is hemmed in by several more or less determinate concepts. We perceive that it is a painting, that it is of a person, that it is a male or a female, perhaps even that it is, for instance, an aged person, etc. These are cognitive judgments that are straightforward applications of concepts to particulars. These judgments do not allow free play and do not bring pleasure. We may be left only to "play" with the expression or with the message of the work as a whole. The range of free play in art is thus more restricted than in nature.

This contrast between natural and artificial is presented in Kant as that between *free* and *adherent* beauty.<sup>11</sup> A free beauty is one that is unconstrained by any concepts, but simply exhibits the form of purposiveness in general. An object that is partly constrained by concepts is an adherent beauty. Kant uses the example of a church. In this case, the purpose of the building limits the imagination of the architect in certain ways because it must, for example, have doors through which one can gain access to its interior. A beautiful church must have certain features because the function is tied up with the concept of such a building. We can say then that something is a beautiful *church*, but this is not the same thing as saying that it

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<sup>8</sup> See Kant, section 33.

<sup>9</sup> We recognize Kant's point here intuitively. In whose opinion of our good looks do we put more faith: our parents or strangers?

<sup>10</sup> Kant, 20:204.

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<sup>11</sup> Kant, section 16.

is beautiful. In order to make this latter judgment, which Kant terms the *pure* judgment of taste, one must either be unaware of what the building is supposed to be, or abstract from this purpose in one's viewing of it.<sup>12</sup>

This is all the deeper we need go into Kant's theory of beauty in order to expose our problem. Let us first summarize Kant's theory: The beautiful object possesses the form of purposiveness. This means that it seems suited to our faculty of placing particulars under concepts, and yet it does not obviously instantiate any particular one. This allows our imagination free reign to play with various concepts in order to make the object meaningful for us. This operation of the imagination brings us pleasure. Nature is the prime realm of objects of this sort, though artifacts can also be beautiful. I do not claim to be a Kant scholar, so there is no doubt room for disagreement about the details of his ideas that I have summarized in the preceding pages. However, I think that the points in Kant I wish to address are sufficiently clear that whatever inaccuracies I may have introduced elsewhere will not affect the substance of my claims.

Here, then, is the problem: Kant claims that beauty has to do with the form of an object and is not something that can be spelled out in rules. Rather, the individual makes a judgment of beauty in response to the free play that the object occasions. This theory seems to imply that some objects are not beautiful because they do not allow free play; but what would this mean? Presumably, it would mean that the concept under which the object falls is so obvious, that the imagination has no

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<sup>12</sup> In Kant's Words, "A judgment of taste in regard to an object with a determinate internal end would thus be pure only if the person making the judgment either had no concept of this end or abstracted from it in his judgment." (5:231) Notice that this abstraction can occur to varying extents: We can abstract from "Church" to "building," and then from "building" to perhaps "artifact," and so on becoming ever more abstract in our concept.

freedom. However, Kant explicitly says in his account of free and adherent beauty that it is possible to abstract from the concept and so make a pure judgment as to whether the thing is beautiful.<sup>13</sup> If this is so, it would seem that no matter how obvious the concept, it would always be possible to abstract, and so see the object as not falling under a concept. In this case, the imagination is released to assign what meaning it will. It has free play, and so the object will be seen as beautiful. The implication is that anything can be beautiful, if only we can abstract from the concept. Certainly, if one is creative enough, this will be possible.<sup>14</sup> This is a problem because Kant does not think that everything can be beautiful, nor should a useful theory of aesthetics.<sup>15</sup> Can Kant's position be rescued from this conclusion?

## II. Expanding Kant's Categories: The Ugly

If we want to escape the conclusion that everything can be beautiful according to Kant's theory, the most natural place to begin is to ask about what Kant calls ugly. If we can give an account of the ugly, then we have another set of objects in contrast to the beautiful, and so not everything is beautiful. This contrast would help us understand exactly why some things cannot be seen as beautiful. The problem is that Kant says almost nothing about ugliness. He does not give an account of it, but only mentions that things like diseases and

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<sup>13</sup> Kant says that the person who "abstracted from [the concept] in his judgment...would have made a correct judgment of taste, in that he would have judged the object as a free beauty." (5:231)

<sup>14</sup> In the film *An American Beauty*, for example, the neighbor finds both the violent death of the main character and bags blowing about in the wind beautiful. This certainly seems like an instance of radical freedom to find beauty where one wills.

<sup>15</sup> Kant explicitly says of objects that elicit loathing that they are impossible to be seen as beautiful. (5:312)

the destruction of war are ugly.<sup>16</sup> However, given the fact that Kant is trying to give an account of the faculty of pleasure *and* displeasure, there should be some parallel account to the one he gives that allows us to describe the ugly as that which causes displeasure. Hudson attempts to do just this.<sup>17</sup> Let's look at his account and then address what I think are its main problems.

Hudson has a rather thorough account of ugliness, but for our purposes we can focus on the most important part of it. We said that a judgment of beauty is based upon the pleasure that results from the play of the imagination and the understanding that is occasioned by a certain type of object. The type of object is one that displays purposiveness though without a purpose. Hudson gives an analogous story of judgments of ugliness. A judgment of ugliness is based upon the displeasure that results from the conflict of the imagination and the understanding that is occasioned by an object that displays contrapurposiveness. This account certainly seems consistent with Kant, and indeed his mention in several places of judgments arising from both pleasure and displeasure suggest that he may have had something like this in mind.<sup>18</sup> While this is a very interesting proposal, and one that I think Kant would endorse, it does not seem to help our problem. In

order to see why, let's look at Hudson's suggestion in more depth.

To begin with, we need to be clear about what contrapurposiveness *is*. We have already said what purposiveness is. It is the appearance that an object has of being suited to our faculty of judgment; it seems to be the kind of thing that we can categorize or see a pattern in. Contrapurposiveness must be not the absence of this quality, but its opposite. Hudson says that such an object appears "as if the object were designed in order to frustrate the power of imagination in its workings with the understanding."<sup>19</sup> This would mean presumably that the object appears to be unsusceptible to categorization or the assignment of a pattern. It somehow thwarts all efforts at characterization.

There seem to be two problems with this description of the ugly object. First of all, it is not clear why this thwarting of the imagination should only bring about displeasure. Kant argues in the case of the sublime that the powers of imagination are frustrated, which brings displeasure, but then this deficiency brings about an awareness of the dignity of reason, which results in pleasure. The response to the sublime is thus a pleasure through displeasure. Why cannot something similar happen with the ugly object that Hudson describes?

The second problem is that this account of the ugly does not seem to match up to the objects that we generally consider ugly. Hudson claims that some works of M.C. Escher would fall within this Kantian category of the ugly. This is because they certainly do thwart our imagination's ability to sort them out. Once again, this is not because of the lack of a recognizable concept, but rather because the works in question present us with a concept and its opposite at the same time. Certain visual cues may suggest an area is concave, while others make it look

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<sup>16</sup> Kant, 5:312.

<sup>17</sup> Actually, Hudson is responding to a slightly different concern than the one I raise. He, too, is concerned about beauty being universal, but he sees this possibility arising from Kant's *Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments* (section 30). He thinks that one could read this deduction as entailing that all cognitive judgments can be converted into judgments of beauty. (Hudson, p. 87.)

<sup>18</sup> For example Kant says at 5:220: "The consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to the state of the subject, for maintaining it in that state, can here designate in general what is called pleasure; in contrast to which displeasure is that representation that contains the ground for determining the state of the representations to their own opposite (hindering or getting rid of them)."

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<sup>19</sup> Hudson, 93.

convex.<sup>20</sup> The problem is that we do not think Escher's work is ugly. In fact, many of us like it and enjoy looking at it. Hudson suggests that this may be due to some interest on our part that precludes a pure aesthetic judgment, but this does not seem to be a helpful suggestion. The problem is that the sorts of things that we think are ugly are not things that we are unable to fit a concept to. Rather we can fit a concept to them just fine. Consider an ugly house. There is nothing about it that defies the imagination, we just don't like it. There is an offense generated somehow, but I do not think that contrapurposiveness is the source of it. I think that Hudson's account of the ugly is consistent with Kant, and the fact that it picks out Escher as ugly is another reason to be skeptical about Kant's theory.<sup>21</sup>

Before we move on, perhaps we should think a little bit more about what contrapurposiveness could mean. Kant divided things that demonstrate purposiveness into free and dependent beauty. Perhaps there is an analogous division in

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<sup>20</sup> In Kant's language, Escher's painting "contains the ground for determining the state of the representations to their own opposite." Kant, 5: 220.

<sup>21</sup> I think that on closer examination the kind of contrapurposiveness displayed in Escher is like that found in instances of the sublime in nature. According to Kant, it is the boundless in nature that we call sublime. The expanse of the sky, for instance, is so great that it cannot be apprehended as a whole. Rather, we can only grasp parts of it at a time. Reason nevertheless demands that we grasp it in its entirety, and it is this demand in the face of the failure of our imagination that causes sublime feelings in us. In the case of Escher, we again are unable to grasp the painting all at once, but must instead see it now this way, and now another way. We struggle with competing interpretations of our visual data. Hudson correctly points out that the conflict here is distinct from that which the sublime in nature causes. In Kant's theory of the sublime, the tension is between the imagination and reason, whereas with something like Escher it appears to be between the imagination and the understanding. Even so, it seems more appropriate to categorize this latter tension as another species of the sublime, especially since it does not arise from the contemplation of things that we consider ugly, but rather those that we may call "interesting" or "clever." Looking at these things may frustrate us, but it gives us pleasure as well.

ugliness. The description of contrapurposiveness that Hudson supplies (and his discussion of Escher) seem to indicate a "free" ugliness. In this sense, contrapurposiveness is the property of an object that makes it seem immune to characterization. What would a "dependent" ugliness be like? Think back to our example of a church in our discussion of dependent beauty. The concept of a church plays a role in our aesthetic evaluation of it since in order to be a church at all certain features must be present. Now suppose we have a building that is supposed to be a church but somehow offends against the concept. The example I have in mind does not just fall short of the concept by lacking something necessary to it, but rather it runs counter to the concept by having features that frustrate the purpose of the building. We might say of modern church architecture that it does this very thing by surrounding the worshiper not with beauty intended to elevate the mind and the spirit, but with plain interiors that mimic an office or a gymnasium. Such surroundings reflect the poor taste and utilitarian cheapness of a consumer culture and do little to encourage detachment from it.<sup>22</sup>

This account of contrapurposiveness is beginning to sound very promising. Perhaps we can designate objects *ugly* that offend against concepts in this way. The problem, however, is that the concept—at least in the above example—is smuggling in a lot that is excluded from Kant's account. Remember that for Kant a pure aesthetic judgment is disinterested and is concerned only with the free play (or lack thereof) occasioned in the mind. The concept of a church that allowed us to render a judgment of contrapurposiveness seems embedded with moral content. To the extent that this is so our judgments about it will be interested because for Kant the

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<sup>22</sup> This characterization of contrapurposiveness along with the example was suggested to me by Don Callen.

perception of the moral always entails an interest in its realization. Hence, this way of talking about ugliness begins to turn aesthetics into an essentially moral discipline. Moreover, we might well argue that the ugliness of these modern churches does not have that much to do with the fact that they are churches. I personally do not find offices or gymnasiums in the same style to be particularly beautiful either.

Let's return to the idea of contrapurposiveness as "free" ugliness. That is, those things are ugly that thwart all efforts at characterization, as Hudson argues that Escher does. Even though this may not be a very satisfactory account of the ugly, it looks like we are making progress on our problem. After all, if some things are ugly, then not everything is beautiful. However, even these "ugly" things can be seen as beautiful. The reason this is so is that judgments of ugliness, like those of beauty, are subjective. They do not describe attributes of the objects, but only our subjective response to them. The reason that Escher appears contrapurposive is that it appears to fall now under one particular concept, and at the same time under another. We feel like we are looking at a right-side-up world when we look at this corner of the painting, but then find that elsewhere in the painting the rules change. According to our concepts of what a painting is, and what the normal relations of objects and gravity require, we try in vain to make it all fit together. We cannot because it does not. Certain portions of the painting contradict other portions of it. But now let us abstract from what it seems like the painting is trying to be and see the figures not as persons but as shapes, and see the stairs as geometrical designs. Will we still find anything contradictory? It would seem not. We would then be free to play with concepts in the same way we do in looking at nature. It could then be beautiful. Hence even things that turn out to

be ugly on Hudson's account are no obstacle to the sufficiently creative.<sup>23</sup>

Hudson's account of the ugly, then, fails to rescue Kant from his problem for two main reasons: It does not pick out the things that we generally consider ugly and since the contrapurposiveness in the object is only a seeming, we can abstract from it to render the object purposive and thus beautiful. We are left in the position then that excepting the sublime everything can be beautiful. This problem, as I said in the beginning, seems to result from Kant's theory inevitably. We will now say more about why.

### III. The Autonomous Will

As we have already said, for Kant beauty is not an attribute of an object and there are therefore no rules that we can give to define in general what is beautiful and what is not. We must look at each thing individually and see whether it occasions the proper relations between the imagination and the understanding. A disinterested pleasure will be the signal that this has happened. Kant implies that objects fall somewhere along a scale. At one end, the pure beauties are those that have no purpose and yet seem purposive in general and automatically bring about the free play. On the other end are those objects that appear contrapurposive and lead to frustration rather than free play. In the middle are those things that fall obviously under a distinct concept and so bring about neither frustration nor play. *Prima fascia*, this sounds like a fairly reasonable way to divide up objects, allowing degrees of beauty and ugliness. The problem though, as we have said, is that Kant says we can abstract from the concepts involved.

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<sup>23</sup> We could emphasize this point by considering the reaction to the painting by a visitor from another planet. Such an individual would not comprehend what the painting was trying to represent. It would, therefore, not seem contrapurposive.

Thus, with sufficient creativity we can convert objects anywhere along the scale into free beauties. As a result, the judgment of beauty becomes not a natural and universal response, but an exercise of the individual will.<sup>24</sup> This view of things makes our expressed opinions about artwork extremely uninteresting, since we would not be saying anything about the art, but only about our relative capacity for imagination.<sup>25</sup>

Even if our judgments of beauty turn out to be uninteresting, would they still be universally valid in the way that Kant thought they were? In order to answer this we must see how my arguments, if correct, effect Kant's deduction. It is in this section where he tries to justify the claim that judgments of beauty are universally valid and necessary. I do not think that my position refutes Kant's deduction, but it radically alters its import. To see how, we should summarize the main points of Kant's deduction. He begins with the proposition that the formal conditions of the operation of our faculty of judgment are necessary conditions for it. For this reason, every being who uses this faculty does so in accordance with these necessary conditions. Wherever we see judgments being made, then, we can assume the same kinds of faculties are operating. The next step is to recall how a judgment of beauty is made. We call an object "beautiful" when it appears suited to enable free play between the imagination and the understanding, which are the two components of judgment. The conclusion for Kant is simple: If an object is suited to enable free such free play for me, then it is similarly suited for everyone since the

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<sup>24</sup> Someone might suggest that we can give an objective account of beauty by stipulating that the easier it is to let the imagination play, the more beautiful the work in question. The problem here is that this will vary from person to person. You may find your mind playing freely with something that I must struggle to separate from its concepts.

<sup>25</sup> Given the nature of much that passes for art these days, a critic would almost seem to boast if he called a work "beautiful."

formal structure of the faculty of judgment is everywhere the same.<sup>26</sup> I have argued Kant's theory entails *every* object (except the sublime) is a possible subject for the free play of our faculties. If this is correct, then we have the right to expect everyone to admit that everything is beautiful. Thus, this account of beauty makes it impossible to sort out the beautiful from the ugly in art, which is a task for which Kant thought it was suited.

In the end it seems that Kant's arguments lead to an erosion of the usefulness of the concept of beauty, and a resounding affirmation of the adage "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." For as we have seen, the necessary conditions for beauty are literally everywhere, but it depends upon the will and imagination to see it. We generally want a theory of aesthetics to aid us in the evaluation of art as well as explain what judgments of beauty and ugliness are and why we make them. Kant's theory fails to help us evaluate art in any meaningful way since it reduces aesthetic judgments to acts of the will. Furthermore, it implies an account of the ugly that does not correspond at all to our unreflective judgments of ugliness. Iris Murdoch has said,

Our aesthetic must stand to be judged by great works or art which we know to be such independently; and it is right that our faith in Kant and Tolstoy should be shaken when we discover shocking eccentricities in their direct judgment of merit in art.<sup>27</sup>

Describing Escher as ugly or implying that anything can be beautiful, are eccentricities that rightly concern us.

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<sup>26</sup> Kant puts it this way: "The pleasure or subjective purposiveness of the representation for the relation of the cognitive faculties in the judging of a sensible object in general can rightly be expected of everyone." Kant, 5: 290.

<sup>27</sup> Murdoch, Iris, "The Sublime and the Good." *Existentialists and Mystics*. ed. Peter Conradi (Penguin Books, 1997), p. 205.



It seems to me that there are two possible ways to respond to Kant. We may reject Kant's radical subjectivity and argue that beauty is in the object. This would allow us to discover criteria for beautiful art and, by implication, ugly art as well. Alternatively, we could reject Kant's requirement of complete disinterestedness and instead claim that art is a moral matter. Hence we might admit that it may be possible to see everything as beautiful, but there are some things which should not be seen in this way. Likewise, there would be things that would rightly repel us and earn the title of ugliness. Whichever path is taken, this much seems sure: the problem in Kant that we have focused on in this paper cannot be solved without significantly altering his ideas.

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