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Comment on Campbell

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Tim Campbell argues that Baker's constitution view does not "make sense of certain anomalous cases of conjoined twins" (Campbell, p. 2). Baker's constitution view holds that "persons are not distinct from the animals with which they are spatially coincident, but, rather, are *constituted* by human animals" (Campbell, p. 2). In Campbell's view, Baker's inability to make sense of conjoined twins "undermines" this view (Campbell, p. 2).

In support of the above, Campbell rightly points out there is problem with what Campbell calls Baker's "one-to-one restriction" (Campbell, p. 5). According to Campbell, this restriction, consistent with Baker's constitution view, is that "no more than one G [a substance] can be constituted by an F [another substance], and no F can constitute more than one G" (Campbell, p. 5). However, as Campbell maintains, there are two cases of conjoined twins where Campbell's restriction does not hold. The first is in the case of *diccephalus*, where there

is a single human organism with two heads (Campbell, p. 6). The second is the case of *?craniothoracopagus twins?*, where there are two human organisms sharing the same head (Campbell, pp. 10-11). Both cases disprove that persons are not distinct from the animals with which they are spatially coincident. As such, they undermine Baker's constitution view, which, in order to be correct, would have to account for the cases mentioned.

Following what has been said, Campbell maintains that *?the dicephalus really is a case of two persons and one organism?* (Campbell, p. 8). This stems from Campbell's idea that the dicephalus has two individual or *?separate* minds?, each of which has its own *?memories, beliefs, and desires?* (Campbell, p. 7). Given that the dicephalus has two minds instead of one, Campbell appropriately appeals to our intuition in saying that it would be challenging to think of the dicephalus as a single person (Campbell, p. 7). This is further reinforced by the notion that personhood is based and dependent on the mind, rather than the organism itself. Where this is so, the mind constitutes the person, contrary to Baker's constitution view. Campbell, demonstrating that this is the case with the dicephalus, effectively weakens this view.

Another place that Campbell appropriately appeals to our intuition is in showing that is against *?commonsense?* to believe that *craniothoracopagus* twins, *?who share nothing but a single organ, are really constituted by one body instead of two?* (Campbell, pp. 12-13). This is something that Baker would have to accept since, as Campbell states, *?if Baker does not distinguish the organism from the body, she will have to treat the twins as a case of two-to-one constitution?*, as described above (Campbell, p. 11). But, as Campbell has shown, treating the twins as such would be difficult for people to agree with as it goes against what people are likely to believe about *craniothoracopagus* twins. That is, that they are not a single body but two bodies, sharing a single head. If *craniothoracopagus* twins are really one person, a possibility mentioned by Campbell, then Baker's

constitution view would be erroneous in relation to our commonsense belief that craniothoracophagus twins have two bodies that constitute the person that these twins make up.

Campbell correctly identifies the value of Baker's constitution view. According to Campbell, Baker's view is ? on the whole, a coherent and persuasive view? (Campbell, p. 14). Baker's view does describe and apply to the case of the normal human being where one person is constituted by the human animal which is that person and with whom that person is spatially coincident. However, since this view does not describe and apply to abnormal human beings, such as conjoined twins, Baker's view does not, in support of Campbell, describe all relations between a person and his or her body. Baker's view, though perhaps partially correct, may be modified to apply to anomalous cases such as conjoined twins. Were Baker's view to do so, it would be strengthened.

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