The World of the Natural Standpoint and the Phenomenology of Emotion
Heidegger and Scheler’s Critiques of Husserl

Abstract:

The focus of this essay is the debate between Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Martin Heidegger on the related issues of the characterization of the world of the natural standpoint and the phenomenological basis of emotion. In contrast to Husserl, Scheler argues that intellective acts are founded upon a priority of the feelability of affectivity, and Heidegger argues that understanding (Verstehen) and state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) are equiprimordial such that neither intellection nor affectivity can properly be given priority. Subsequent to an analysis of these three positions, I conclude that a combination of Heidegger's consideration of the equiprimordiality of understanding and affectivity with Husserl and Scheler's insights provides the most accurate phenomenological description of the world of the natural standpoint and the phenomenological basis of emotion.

1. Introduction

The focus of this essay is the debate between Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Martin Heidegger on the related issues of the characterization of the world of the natural standpoint and the phenomenological basis of emotion. In contrast to Husserl, Scheler argues that intellective acts are founded upon a priority of the feelability of affectivity, and Heidegger argues that understanding (Verstehen) and state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) are equiprimordial such that neither intellection nor affectivity can properly be given priority. Subsequent to an analysis of these three positions, I conclude that a combination of Heidegger's consideration of the equiprimordiality of understanding and affectivity with Husserl and Scheler's insights provides the most accurate phenomenological description of the world of the natural standpoint and the phenomenological basis of emotion.

2. Background

This subsection provides necessary background on Husserl’s characterization of the world of the natural attitude and the phenomenological basis of emotions. Additionally, a brief
note on my usage of terminology is also necessary because Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger do not all use the particular terms for affective or axiological phenomena with uniformity. For this reason, I use 'emotion' as a general term as Husserl uses it in his Lectures on Ethics and the Theory of Value to mean "valuing acts of every kind, every kind of emotional position-taking," which includes what might be referred to as axiological or affective phenomena broadly construed.¹ Additionally, I will use ‘value’ and ‘state-of-mind’ as Scheler and Heidegger respectively use these terms unless otherwise noted.

a) The World of the Natural Standpoint

In Ideas I, Husserl characterizes the natural standpoint as the pre-phenomenological attitude in which human beings normally experience the world. In contradistinction to a naturalistic world of natural science, the world of the natural standpoint is simply the everyday world in which objects within the world are discovered immediately and given intuitively in human experience. According to Husserl, corporeal things or objects within the world are initially "for me simply there" or "present" pre-theoretically whether or not special attention is focused upon such objects.² However, it is important to note that even here Husserl acknowledges, despite an initial naïve realism, that the world of the natural standpoint is not merely a collection of "facts" or simple "spatio-temporal relations." Instead, the world of the natural standpoint is always already a world of values and goods, specifically "this world is not there for me as a mere world of facts and affairs, but, with the same immediacy as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world."³

¹ Husserl, Lectures on Ethics and the Theory of Value, 243.
² Husserl, Ideas I, 101.
³ Ibid., 103.
After a discussion of the world of the natural standpoint, Husserl's characterization of the phenomenological attitude and the epoché can be understood. Whereas the natural standpoint characterized the immediately given world of experience, the phenomenological standpoint and the phenomenological reduction, the epoché and the reduction proper, entail an attempt to bracket or "put out of action" the ontological assumptions of naïve realism in the natural standpoint. However, the phenomenological attitude and the phenomenological reduction do not entail an explicit denial of the reality of the natural world or the complete replacement of the natural attitude. Instead, the epoché operates as an abstention of judgment concerning the ontological "Being" or spatio-temporal existence (Dasein) of a given thing for the sake of determining what is essential and therefore apodictic about phenomena, a determination apprehended in the reduction proper.

b) The Phenomenology of Emotion

Husserl's consideration of the phenomenological basis of emotion is his attempt to isolate the essential aspects of emotions in contrast to the assumption that emotions are merely subjective, contingent, or non-rational states. In Lectures on Ethics and the Theory of Value, Husserl argues that there are laws of formal consistency that relate to evaluation and emotion just as there are laws of formal consistency in thinking such as the rules of formal logic. Consequently, Husserl concludes that emotional acts must be logically founded upon intellective acts, a relation outlined in volume two of Logical Investigations, where founding refers to a relation whereby "an A as such requires foundation by an M or also that an A as such needs to be supplemented by an M" (where A refers to emotional acts and M signifies intellective acts proper

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5 Ibid., 111.
insofar as emotional acts as such cannot by themselves lead to objectivization). That is, emotional acts logically require that an object of the act is first presented, a position Husserl developed in part based upon Brentano’s position that “nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing.”

In development of Brentano's position, Husserl notes that emotional acts can only be properly called acts insofar as the act is intentionally directed toward some determinate object of the emotion or evaluation. Indeed, fear is always fear about or intentionally directed toward something or object as feared; similarly, joy is always joy about something, etc. The intentionality involved in emotional acts entails a type of "taking" of the world in apprehension, a focal mode of awareness or "mindful heeding," as valuable or valued in experience (wertnehmung) in a similar fashion to the way in which perceptual apprehension (wahrnehmung) motivates a "taking" of a particular thing as true. Additionally, Husserl argues that emotional acts are founded on intellective acts insofar as emotional acts are not essential for the nature, constitution, or appearance of the value-object in question. For example, that a house can be presented as a "house" at all as a determinate object is constituted by non-axiological predicates that are essential to the thing being considered (e.g. its thing-nature as constituted by natural realities such as wood and glass). This aspect of emotion explains how emotional acts of

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7 Husserl, *Logical Investigations* III, 463; *Lectures on Ethics and the Theory of Value*, 243. Consideration of the objectifying dimension of intellective acts can also be found in the Fifth Meditation of Husserl's *Logical Investigation*, see Med. V, 620-624 and 639-642.
8 Brentano, *Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint*, 60-61. This point is developed specifically by Husserl in *Ideas I* in the third chapter of the third section on noesis and noema (*Ideas I*, 255-256).
9 It is important to note that the usage of “thing” in this fashion refers to the minimum determinacy required for emotional acts to exist and not insofar as emotional acts can only be directed toward inanimate objects as such.
10 *Ideas I*, 114-115; *Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint*, 75-76.
11 I draw this specific point from an essay by John Drummond, "Feelings, Emotions, and Truly Perceiving the Valuable" (Drummond, "Feelings, Emotions, and Truly Perceiving the Valuable 363).
12 *Lectures On Ethics and the Theory of Values*, 24; Axiological-predicates like frightening, nostalgic, or joyous can all be "annulled" or abstractly negated without fundamentally annihilating the determinate object in question.
evaluation can have a proper “fit” with the non-emotional things involved such that certain emotional responses can be deemed appropriate or inappropriate accordingly.\textsuperscript{13}

3. Scheler's Critique of Husserl\textsuperscript{14}

a) The World of the Natural Standpoint

Scheler rejects Husserl’s characterization of the world of the nature standpoint as one primarily of “logical individuals” constituted by a thing-structure because he believes this characterization conceals the foundational importance of values and the priority of feeling and “axiological individuals.”\textsuperscript{15} Whereas Husserl characterized the world of the natural standpoint as constituted by things present in perception as correlates of consciousness, Scheler describes the world of the natural standpoint as one primarily of “value things or goods (and affairs [Sachen]), not primarily things of perception.”\textsuperscript{16} That is, if the primary mode of being and appearance of thing is a function of its value-structure rather than its thing-structure, then the unity of the thing in question and its determinate “whatness” is a function not of its presentation in acts of

\textsuperscript{13} Additionally, Husserl develops an analogy Brentano had argued for in The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong whereby the intentionality of judgmental acts and emotional acts are similar insofar as 'truth' and 'falsity' in judgment share a parity with 'pleasing' and 'displeasing' in emotion, an analogy that demonstrates that emotional acts such as the apprehension of value must first be logically founded on something given first in a presentation that is not emotive or judgment as such (The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, 18).

\textsuperscript{14} Although Scheler does not mention Husserl by name in Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values, in many ways Scheler's phenomenological consideration of value represents a fundamental critique of Husserl’s characterization of the world of the natural standpoint and the phenomenology of emotion. For specific treatment of this critique and the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Scheler, see Quentin Smith's "Scheler's Critique of Husserl's Theory of the World of the Natural Standpoint." While Scheler agrees with Husserl that evaluating acts and values can be understood to have an \textit{a priori} structure, Scheler is critical of Husserl’s prioritization of presentation and the thing-structure of objects when considering both the world of the natural standpoint as a collection of presented things and the founded nature of emotional acts.

\textsuperscript{15} The term “axiological individuals” is not specifically used by Scheler, but Quentin Smith has put forth compelling argumentation concerning its validity as an analog to “logical individuals,” given that Scheler seeks to critique Husserl's prioritization of distinctly intellicative acts (see Smith, "Scheler's Critique of Husserl's Theory of the World of the Natural Standpoint, 390).

\textsuperscript{16} Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, 133-134.
perception, but instead this unity is a function of and therefore founded upon its axiological givenness in the feelability of values.\textsuperscript{17}

b) The Phenomenology of Emotion

According to Scheler, values are primarily \textit{feelable} in quality and \textit{a priori} though material (non-formal) in terms of their givenness.\textsuperscript{18} Consequently, values themselves cannot be reduced to mere formal principles nor the objects in which values inhere as mere "value-bearers." Scheler contends that the being and appearance of the characteristics of objects are founded on feeling as a response to value rather than on the presentation of an object as Husserl had argued. Scheler claims specifically, “a man can be distressing and repugnant, agreeable, or sympathetic to us without our being able to apprehend \textit{how} this comes about. And, a landscape or a room in a house can appear ‘friendly’ or ‘distressing’ and the same holds for a sojourn in a room, without our knowing the \textit{bearers} of such values.”\textsuperscript{19} That is, the apprehension of an individual is mediated by the axiological dimension that presupposes and thereby constitutes the object as presented, i.e. as mediately presented through feeling as an axiological “medium” and thus the

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 12-15; 17; 34, 39; Scheler characterizes three main kinds of axiological individuals: 1) affairs, 2) value-states-of-affairs, and 3) goods, all individuals whose unity is based upon their value-structure and not their natural thing-structure. In all three cases the axiological individuals in question are not valuable insofar as they are composed by natural realities or evaluated in an emotional act in Husserl's sense. Thus, for Scheler, the world of the natural standpoint is founded upon the axiological structure and reality of axiological individuals such that an object’s thing-structure can only be focused on as the foundation of its nature and unity only derivately. An affair refers to a thing that has a certain value, which may or may not be a natural thing of perception in particular (\textit{Ibid.}, 20.). Scheler uses a plot of land as an example of an affair by noting that although an acre of land is composed by natural realities such as earth, flora, and fauna, the determinate “whatness” of the land as “my property” is a function of a value-stratum, specifically its value \textit{as} property and in reference to me. Value-states-of-affairs refer to value-complexes that found state of affairs as meaningful activities, events, or arrangements of objects as the case may be (\textit{Ibid.}, 126-127). A value-complex is a structure of value-qualities as unified in specific objects that can then be described in terms of value-states-of-affairs. Additionally, a good refers to a “thinglike unity” of value-qualities or value-complexes which is founded on a specific basic value, for example the basic value of 'beauty' in reference to an aesthetic object such as a painting (\textit{Ibid.}, 20.).

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 17.
givenness of an object as an objective unity also depends upon its givenness as an axiological individual.\textsuperscript{20}

4. Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl\textsuperscript{21}

a) The World of the Natural Standpoint

In \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger characterizes the world of the natural standpoint as primarily constituted by practicalities or "equipment" rather than objects or things simply present to Dasein, Heidegger's term for the unitary phenomenon of human Being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{22} Although particular pieces of equipment or things "ready-to-hand" (\textit{zuhanden}) can be isolated from the practical dimension of equipmentality and inspected as an object merely "present-at-hand" (\textit{vorhanden}), Heidegger argues that this process of isolation entails a derivation from Dasein's primordial comportment toward the world.\textsuperscript{23} That is, equipmentality and readiness-to-hand (\textit{zuhandenheit}) constitute the primordial intentionality\textsuperscript{24} or comportment of Dasein in the world whereby such entities are meaningful as equipment only insofar as they are specifically \textit{not} available for inspection or intellective apprehension or Husserlian phenomenological analysis.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{21} Heidegger’s disagreement with the early work of Husserl is made most explicit in \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, wherein Heidegger charges that Husserl repeats the mistakes of the Cartesian philosophical tradition with its associated dichotomy between subject and object (Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, 21; 124.). Specifically, Heidegger argues that Husserl mischaracterizes the world of the natural standpoint and the phenomenology of emotion as predicated on an overemphasis on presentation and the intellectual dimension of human experience respectively. \textit{Being and Time} represents Heidegger's early attempt to correct the perceived shortcomings of Husserl's early phenomenological considerations.
\textsuperscript{22} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 96.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 97-98. For a specific treatment of this topic, see Sara Heinämaa's "Varieties of Presence: Heidegger and Husserl's Accounts of the Useful and the Valuable."
\textsuperscript{24} Heidegger does not use ‘intentionality’ specifically because of the Scholastic and Husserlian historical baggage he associates with this term. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to phenomenologically describe human experience without some reference to intentionality and thus Heidegger opts instead for the term ‘comportment.’
According to Heidegger, the phenomenological attitude and the phenomenological reduction serve are not merely methodological tools whereby the transcendental structure of consciousness is apprehended without reference to ontological considerations, but rather entail the phenomenological shift from the being of entities to Being as such through the entity that discloses the world, Dasein. Thus, for Heidegger, phenomenology is fundamentally concerned with ontological considerations despite Husserl's attempt to bracket the ontological commitment entailed by the naïve realism of the natural attitude. For this reason, Heidegger's refers to Dasein's ontological totality as a being who is engaged in the world as Dasein's being as Care (Sorge), a fundamental ontological aspect of Dasein's comportment in the world that discloses Being-in-the-world as a whole.

b) The Phenomenology of Emotion

In contrast to the priority given to presentation as an intellective, objectifying emotional act, Heidegger characterizes the relationship between understanding (Verstehen) and state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) as one of ontological equiprimordiality such that neither aspect is prioritized. According to Heidegger, understanding and state-of-mind are two fundamental existentialia of Dasein’s Being-in along with discourse, terminology meant to capture the ontological disclosure of the world as there for Dasein in a significant unitary phenomenon. Rather than postulating fundamental categories through which Dasein exists akin to an inanimate natural object, existentialia signify the inherently existential dimension of Dasein's being as a lived experience that cannot be abstracted into formal categorical considerations. State-of-mind

25 The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 21; Being and Time, 50.
26 Ibid., 225-230.
27 Unfortunately the term Befindlichkeit has no clear, unproblematic cognate in English. For this reason, I have retained Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of Befindlichkeit as "state-of-mind." But it must be remembered that Dasein as Being-in-the-world cannot be reduced or analyzed in terms of “the mind” or mental phenomena as such; instead, this translation can be understood with qualification given the inherent difficulty involved in translation more generally.
28 Ibid., 169-171.
refers to the ontological ground of Dasein’s affectivity or ability to be affected by a world wherein things matter to Dasein insofar as they are endowed with a dimension of meaning.\textsuperscript{29}

Given Heidegger’s claim concerning the equiprimordiality of understanding and state-of-mind, no priority can be given to either \textit{existentiale} without concealing the unitary phenomenon that is Dasein as Being-in-the-world. That is, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine "original" or "first" experience that is not always already constituted by \textit{both} affective and intellective dimensions, up to and including emotions (\textit{Stimmung}) and some understanding of the world. Instead, Heidegger insists that understanding and any particular emotion only occur within an extended interpretive framework that anticipates any explicit intellective act as such.\textsuperscript{30}

This “hermeneutic circle” of understanding undermines any foundationalist or representationalist claim to the priority of the intellect or intellective knowledge associated with the Cartesian tradition in favor of common primordial basis of understanding \textit{and} emotion.\textsuperscript{31}

5. The World of the Natural Standpoint and the Phenomenology of Emotion Reconsidered

a) The World of the Natural Standpoint

The specific disagreements between Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger are a function of a difference in emphasis. All three of these thinkers believe on some level to be accurately

\textsuperscript{29} Understanding then refers to the circumspective intelligibility of Dasein’s existential \textit{there}, an \textit{existentiale} often considered as intellection, which Heidegger believes has been overemphasized in the tradition of western philosophy up to and including the work of Husserl.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, 193-194.

\textsuperscript{31} Based upon these considerations, emotions and moods are ontologically important for Dasein’s being as the affective ontological basis through which the world and Dasein as Care are disclosed. Heidegger argues that the mood anxiety has a unique ontological function insofar as it discloses Dasein as Care by disclosing Dasein’s authentic (\textit{eigentlichkeit}) possibilities as Being-in-the-world (\textit{Ibid.}, 232-233). In the mood anxiety, the world appears to lose its determinate meaning and thus Dasein no longer feels at home in the world. For these reasons, anxiety discloses Dasein’s ontological-existential situation as one of Care in a manner that cannot be simply identified by any intellective or cognitive act nor analyzed in terms of a specific subject and object. Indeed, Heidegger even goes as far as to claim that in anxiety there is no determinate intentional object of the generalized mood, a characterization of the phenomenology of emotion, in Husserl’s sense, which stands in stark contrast to the claim that presentation deserves priority when considering the intentional structure of emotions.
describing the world of the natural attitude so at least in this sense they share a common
philosophical end or goal. To defend Husserl, it is clear from his characterization of the natural
world that it is one primarily of both valued and practical objects, even though Husserl does not
go as far to characterize valuation as a “medium” and practicality as a unitary phenomenon of
“equipmentality” as such. Despite the criticism that Husserl reduces the experienced involved in
the natural attitude to an overly intellectual or cognitive experience, as mentioned in the
background subsection, he notes explicitly that this world is a practical world of values.
Moreover, Husserl anticipates and prefigures both Scheler and Heidegger’s characterizations of
the world of the natural standpoint insofar as both Scheler and Heidegger acknowledge that this
world is experienced prior to any type of theoretical or scientific considerations as such.

Thus the difference, I argue, is mainly one of a difference in emphasis, an emphasis
informed by each thinker’s broader philosophical and epistemic concerns. That is, the apparent
philosophical shortcomings that Heidegger highlights in what he calls the “metaphysics of
presence” factors in to his interpretation of Husserl’s own philosophical considerations, a concern
that leads Heidegger to project his own presuppositions into Husserl’s position. This can be
understood not only insofar as many of Heidegger’s philosophical considerations are found in
and prefigured by Husserl, as Dermot Moran has recently pointed out.32 But more importantly,
Husserl himself is explicitly critical of the Cartesian tradition in general and the Cartesian
aspects of Brentano’s philosophy in particular. Husserl would agree with Heidegger that any sort
of subject-object dichotomy or reduction of consciousness to pure intellection is inadequate on
both philosophical and phenomenological grounds. Thus, the difference is that Heidegger rejects
what he takes to be the Cartesian terminology and language of Husserl without fully
acknowledging his debt to Husserl’s insights.

32 Moran, “Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality,” 39-40; 53-54.
Scheler is concerned with Kantian considerations of formalism in ethics and axiology, and in rejecting Kant's requirements concerning the relationship between formalism and a priority, Scheler identifies Husserl's characterization of the world as in some sense fundamentally Kantian. However, and despite Husserl's general agreement with Kant on certain issues pertaining to formal consistency and a priority, Husserl's early philosophy is not merely a repetition of Kant. It appears again that Scheler's critique of Kant leads him to group Husserl with the entirety of Kant's critical project without justification and with the result that Husserl's own ideas are concealed as well.

While there is overlap and some fundamental agreement concerning the world of the natural standpoint for these three thinkers, the specific question concerning the nature and role of the phenomenological attitude is a more contentious issue. Generally, I agree with Heidegger's characterization of the pre-phenomenological world as one primarily of engagements and equipmentality as a unitary dimension of the world. Human experience first and foremost is circumscribed by practical concerns, and despite Heidegger's dismissal of axiology, this experience is endowed with particular practical-values whether the concern is simply nutrition or higher-order concerns such as flourishing in a modern, post-industrial society. However, I disagree with Heidegger's characterization of Husserlian phenomenology as primarily one of “falling away” from this world of significance by way of the phenomenological attitude and the phenomenological reduction.\(^3\) I am not compelled by the claim that simply shifting one's

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\(^{3}\) This leads to the question of the functional role of ontological considerations within phenomenology given that Heidegger’s focus on the question of Being (die Seinsfrage) appears to stand in clear contradistinction to Husserl's attempt to bracket such ontological questions, at least when attempting to isolate what is essential to phenomena. Although a "complete" epoché as Heidegger characterizes it is not possible, Husserl acknowledges this fact when he notes that the world of the natural standpoint can never be fully eliminated, as such fundamental elimination of the natural world is unintelligible. Thus I am in agreement with Husserl that the purpose of phenomenology is one of describing the way in which the world appears to us up to and including the pre-phenomenological world of the natural standpoint, and not, as Heidegger suggests, some attempt to unconceal the fundamental ontological ground of Dasein, as if we must reveal and thereby “return” to the primary ontological World from which we cannot help
attention or attitude to things as objects "present-at-hand" entails any sort of derivative Being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{34}

Scheler's characterization of the world as constituted primarily by value things or goods provides an important insight but ultimately fails to adequately describe the world of the natural standpoint. Although Husserl would agree with Scheler that value-things are experienced primarily in experience of the world of the natural standpoint, through Husserl's considerations it is clear that values themselves are not given primarily as such in experience. I am inclined to agree with Scheler that value-things or values as constituted by evaluated objects appear to play a fundamental and primary role in the significance of the world. In one sense, emotional acts and values are what allow the world to be meaningful at all insofar as the axiological-stratum "animates" things in the world and endows them with a type of existence that affects human beings.

Nevertheless, I believe Scheler ultimately overemphasizes the functional role of emotions and values in experience precisely because they are given with a type of intensity that logical individuals constituted by a thing-structure initially lack. This fact concerning values, however, is precisely why Husserl proposes a phenomenological method to conceptually isolate the non-emotive and non-axiological structures of phenomena required for experience at all, though not initially given as “standing out” from the intelligible background of experience in the natural standpoint.\textsuperscript{35} Scheler's characterization of the natural world should be understood as an important reminder that the axiological dimension experience is never fully absent and yet this

\textsuperscript{34} If Heidegger is correct in this regard at all, we must include Husserl's characterization of phenomenology itself as an outgrowth and expression of Dasein's being and not a fundamentally inadequate characterization of this Being-in-the-world.

\textsuperscript{35} Even within the assumed naïve realism of the natural attitude, values are not experienced as being primary nor given in experience prior to the fact-world of everyday experience.
fact alone does not entail that the world is primarily constituted by values as such, especially given that Scheler acknowledges that values do not exist apart from value-bearers in the world in a transcendent sense.

b) The Phenomenology of Emotion

Although the phenomenological consideration of emotion by Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger provide valuable insights into the intelligible and meaningful nature of emotions, I believe Heidegger and Husserl most accurately describe the phenomenology of emotion. To see the plausibility of this interpretation, I turn to an essay by John Drummond, "The Intentional Structure of Emotions," wherein he argues for a combination of Heidegger’s equiprimordiality claim and Husserl’s priority-of-presentation claim. Drummond makes a distinction between the relationship between cognitive and affectivity as it pertains to experience on the one hand and the relationship in sense rather than acts on the other. Thus, Heidegger is correct when he notes that, in experience, neither understanding nor state-of-mind are given priority and there exists a hermeneutical relationship between the two such that each understanding has a mood and vice versa. However, Husserl is also correct when he notes that the sense of an emotional act must be based upon or founded in some intellective, objectifying act that is independent of any specific type of evaluation. Thus values as such do not and cannot exist without some foundational basis in an intellective act if simply because there must be something present to which an emotive intentional relation can be based. While Husserl's description concerning the ability to "annul" certain axiological-predicates or value-characteristics can elucidate the

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36 Specifically: "Wahrnehmung and Wertnehmung interpenetrate one another; they are not separate experiences of the object, one piled on top of another...in an experience at once cognitive and affective, we immediately and at once - in a single Nehmung - experience the axiological attributes of the thing or situation as well as particular non-axiological properties that underlie, motivate, and justify (or not) our affective response to that thing" (Drummond, "The Intentional Structure of Emotions," 4).

37 Emotional acts or values themselves are never given without reference to the thing in question precisely because emotional acts rely upon the implicit priority of the givenness in presentation when the focus is on the meaning or sense of the act.
relationship between cognition and affectivity, but this fact does not entail that an object can be
given with absolutely no potential or actual axiological dimensions as such.  

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38 However, Scheler is incorrect if he believes that simply switching the founded relationship between feeling and presentation can accurately describe the phenomenology of emotion in human life. Instead, Scheler is correct that, at first, things are given in a type of indeterminate totality through which value-things, as opposed to values or things, are presented. That being said, Husserl could fully agree with this characterization, if it is acknowledged that although there is an initial state of indeterminacy and emotional acts have a specific type of value-intensity, these factors alone do not eliminate the fundamental importance of presentation as the result of intellectual, objectifying acts. This conclusion can be seen if we return to some of the examples that Scheler put forth in an attempt to justify his phenomenological consideration of emotion. To return to Scheler’s example of the precedence of values, Husserl is correct concerning the priority of presentation at least insofar as it operates implicitly even in this example because no matter how indeterminate the object is it still has some objective significance as a person or as a human being. Indeed, the object is at least determinate enough that it is given as an object that has a value-stratum at all, let alone one capable of providing meaningful values that occur specifically in the encounter of human beings (e.g. as ‘friendly’ or ‘distressing’). Perhaps Scheler might respond that at times there is a givenness of values even when the object does not adequately relate to those values, that ‘friendly’ or ‘distressing’ can apply also to inanimate objects or things that cannot, strictly speaking, be friendly or distressing at all. However, this point merely shows that evaluating acts can be either 1) objectively inadequate insofar as the value does not share a parity with the object involved or 2) a factor of the overall meaningful relation that constitutes the world such that any particular object, even an inanimate one, can be given in relation to the entire value-stratum of human experience as such.
