Comments on Jim Darcy’s “Grounding Necessitation and Composition”

- (p. 1) What is the relation between grounding and metaphysical explanation? What’s the distinction between metaphysical explanation and and causal explanation?

- (p. 3) You say that “Necessitation is compatible with worlds in which the xs exist and y exists, but the xs do not ground y”. What accounts for that compatibility?

- (p. 5) What theory of objects are you relying on? In what sense does y exist at t₁ and t₂? Why shouldn’t we think that the xs-1 ground y-1, rather than y?

- (p. 7) Can you explain the concept of ‘suitably arranged parts’? Can you give some examples?

- (p. 5) Why do you think the xs-1 exist at t₁? How many suitable arrangements exist at t₁?

- (pp. 7-8) Why is the loss of a part from t₁ to t₂ irrelevant to the arrangement fact involving the xs-1? Don’t the xs and the xs-1 stand in different relations at t₂ than they do at t₁ since y loses a part?

- (p. 8) On page 8 you say, “But surely a statuewise arrangement is not jealous in van Inwagen’s sense. It doesn’t make a difference to whether certain parts are arranged statuewise if subsets of those parts are also arranged statuewise”. What difference are you saying it doesn’t make? Why is that difference not made? In what sense is the subset of parts arranged statuewise?